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ABSTRACT
The authors (Maslen et al., 2014) propose to regulate cognitive enhance-
ment devices (CEDs) as medical devices. Extending medical device reg-
ulations to CEDs raises some important questions that need to be ade-
quately addressed before it makes sense to pursue this path. A first prob-
lem concerns the definition of ‘cognitive enhancement’ and ‘CEDs’.Where
does treatment end and enhancement begin? Secondly, since most CEDs
such as neurofeedback and transcranial direct current stimulation are cur-
rently performed by non-medical health care providers, how will this regu-
lation impact the current practice, and which requirements need to be put
in place to regulate their use? Thirdly, distributive justice issues present an
obvious ethical limitation. Fourthly, if CEDs are indeed prescribed off-label
similar to the off-label prescription of psychopharmacological enhancers
by MDs, this will pose problems regarding a lack of sufficient knowledge
and expertise due to the highly specialized nature of CEDs. And finally, are
we faced with unnecessary worries and unrealistic hopes when it comes to
CEDs? In sum, we propose to regulate them regarding product safety and
restrict them to competent adult use including professional oversightwhere
indicated.
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Regulation of cognitive enhancement devices  317
While intuitively it is evident that tools such as cognitive enhancement devices (CEDs)
that can pose a health risk to the consumer should be regulated, the question is how?
This is addressed in the manuscript by Maslen and co-workers. The authors propose
to extend the medical device legislation to cover CEDs by focusing on devices such as
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and neurofeedback.
There are basically four options for regulation of CEDs.
1. Keep a status quo, ie don’t regulate.
2. Regulate CEDs as medical devices, as proposed by the authors.
3. Regulate them only on product safety, in a way similar to food supplements or
preventive tools like toothpaste.
4. Regulate them on product safety, and additionally regulate the personal use of
CEDs, in a way similar to the use of alcohol.
A first question is whether these devices do need regulation? Are they really posing a
health risk that warrants such a regulation? Techniques such as neurofeedback, tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), or tDCS are typically framed as non-invasive
brain stimulation techniques.1 Orwould a regulation like alcohol, ie not below a certain
age limit, be sufficient, for example with warning signs on the devices that they might
pose a threat, as in cigarettes andalcoholic drinks?Whereas the authorspropose the sec-
ond of the four options, we argue that there are some issues that need to be addressed
before this can be universally adopted. While these are being addressed, we propose
to use the fourth option, ie to regulate these devices on product safety in combination
with regulating their personal use, but without classifying them as medical devices.
To start with, there is a problem with the definition of cognitive enhancement, and
if cognitive enhancement per se is hard to define, how do you define a CED?We need
to ask ourselves whether we are prepared to change the definition of health used by
the Medical Devices Directive (MDD), currently demanding diagnostic and/or ther-
apeutic medical purposes, in such a way that it includes enhancement purposes. It is
common knowledge that one cannot easily draw a line between treatment and en-
hancement.2 Whether or not we consider an intervention as enhancement rather than
treatment depends on our definition of health and disease. At what point does an in-
tervention go beyond the restoration and sustainment of good health and become an
enhancement (ie pursues a non-medical purpose)? If we define good health as widely
as the World Health Organization does, involving complete physical, mental, and
social well-being, then there seems to be no essential difference between plastic surgery
for medical reconstructive versus esthetic reasons. Both can lead to an improvement in
an individual’s physical, mental, and social well-being. Similarly, how we differentiate
between normal and pathological functioning is a normative issue that draws upon our
definition of health and disease.
The same problems arise when we aim to provide a comprehensive list of CEDs.
How do you define a CED? The authors define a CED as ‘a piece of equipment or
combination of pieces of equipment that is sold and used to affect the functioning of
1 Anna-Katharine Brem et al., Is Neuroenhancement by Noninvasive Brain Stimulation aNet Zero-Sum Proposition?
85 NEUROIMAGE 1058, 1068 (2014).
2 Maartje Schermer,Health, Happiness and Human Enhancement—Dealing with Unexpected Effects of Deep Brain
Stimulation, 6 NEUROETHICS 435, 445 (2013).
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318  Regulation of cognitive enhancement devices
the brain such that it performs better in at least one cognitive domain (eg memory,
attention, learning, facial recognition)’. Are there benefits in separating devices with
a medical purpose from those without such a purpose, as suggested by the European
Commission?How do you determine which devices fall within the realm of devices in-
tended for cognitive enhancement?Or, do wewant to change the definition of medical
devices to include enhancement purposes?
Moreover, cognitive enhancement in the setting of a treatment for cognitive de-
cline is different from cognitive enhancement in a healthy person, who wants only to
enhance his/her normal skills, analogous to medication being taken for a disease, eg
methylphenidate taken for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder versus for enhance-
ment in sports. Furthermore, what about prevention of cognitive decline? Prevention
of cognitive decline from a neurobiological point of view can be regarded analogous to
toothpaste in the prevention of tooth decay. It is clear that in a tooth abscess, antibiotics
and possibly surgery are needed, which are medically regulated, whereas toothpaste is
not. Does that mean that when a company only promotes its CED as a preventive de-
vice, it will fall under different regulation?The authors have foreseen this and propose
to make up a list of devices that can be used both for preventive and enhancement pur-
poses, analogous to a list of specially regulated medications in many countries.
This approach could suggest that the same rules be applied as in the medication
world. However, the difference between a medication and a food supplement is not al-
ways clear. For example, in some countries melatonin is freely available, not restricted
by medical regulation, whereas in other countries it is considered a medication. Med-
ication is used as a therapy whereas food supplements are used for enhancement, or
prevention of diseases. But somemedications are used off-label as cognitive enhancers,
eg modafinil or amphetamines, and some food supplements are used as treatments, or
are perceived as such, eg melatonin. Neurofeedback, TMS, or tDCS could be similarly
prescribed off-label for enhancement purposes and similar differences between coun-
tries could arise which then pose potential problems involving cross border use.
Another important aspect of regulating tDCS andneurofeedback asmedical devices
is the consequences of applying medical device regulation to tDCS, TMS, and espe-
cially neurofeedback. Most neurofeedback now is performed by non-medical health
care providers. Does the regulation of the CED then require new regulations for who
can apply them? Will only MDs be permitted to use CEDs, or nurses or psychologists
under supervision of an MD? And will consumers need a prescription for a CED and
subsequently get a device at a pharmacy-like place? Will this involve a minimum num-
ber of training hours with subsequent accreditation under the supervision of an MD,
nurse, psychologist, or other trained expert?
Schermer argues that although some enhancements may fall within the goals of
medicine, we have good reasons to limit the kind of interventions MDs are allowed or
required to do.3 It is obvious that the use of CEDs does not belong to the core goals of
medicine, and it is questionable whether it should. However, one might argue that the
use of CEDs should be seen as an extended goal of medicine. Or one might argue that
the goals of medicine need to be adapted in response to new technological challenges
such as the use of tDCS for enhancement purposes.While enhancement should not be
3 Id.
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seen as a part of anMD’s medical duty, it’s clearly less problematic if MDs with the re-
quired expertise do view improvements beyond curing and preventing disease as one
of the goals of their profession. It is unclear, however, why the use of CEDs should be
limited to the medical domain and by extension, and why its regulation should fall un-
der themedical devices legislation. As medical skills and expertise are scarce resources,
we should not take this issue lightheartedly. Do we want to allow or promote the use of
valuable medical skills and expertise for enhancement purposes rather than reserving
these scarce resources more narrowly for curing and preventing disease?
Although the authors mention distributive justice as an ethical limitation when en-
hancement interventions are brought within the publicly fundedmedical domain, they
seem to question the argument’s strength based upon the fact that similar issues may
arise, and do arise, when considering treatment. However, their consistent counter-
argument only holds when one does not draw a morally relevant distinction between
treatment and enhancement (eg defends the position that both treatment and en-
hancement are mere improvements of human functioning). Individuals that do draw a
morally relevant distinction between treatment and enhancementmay argue that there
are good reasons to preferentially allocate resources to curing, alleviating, and prevent-
ing disease rather than to enhancing healthy individuals.Hence, the argument’s validity
crucially depends on one’s normative position.
Forlini andRacinemention the scarcity of health care resources as one of their three
main reasons to dismiss the ethical acceptability of off-label prescription of cognitive
enhancers.4 They also state that ‘with uncertain benefits and clear harms, it is difficult
to support the notion that physicians should prescribe a medication to a healthy indi-
vidual for enhancement purposes’. Although good reasons could be given to support
such a claim, categorically banning off-label prescription by physicians will likely drive
the use of cognitive enhancers underground and should therefore not be the preferred
strategy.5 However, if we allow off-label prescription either by medical or non-medical
professionals, several challenges will need to be addressed.
With regard to the off-label prescription of psychopharmacological cognitive en-
hancers, a survey among primary care physicians in Germany found that while a rela-
tively high proportion of physicians have been asked to prescribe cognitive enhancers,
only a minority is well informed about the possibilities of cognitive enhancement.6
Due to the specialized nature of CEDs, a lack of sufficient knowledge and exper-
tise might be even more problematic in this domain. Hence, specialized non-medical
health care providers or other skilled experts may be better suited to safeguard the cor-
rect use of CEDs and to assess whether continued use is warranted. Potentially much
more problematic however is personal use of such devices without any professional
or clinical guidance/oversight. If we want to avoid adverse reactions or ineffective use
of CEDs, tDCS and neurofeedback training need to be tailored to the individual due
to non-uniform effects among individuals. As already alluded to by the authors, these
4 Cynthia Forlini & Eric Racine, Stakeholder Perspectives and Reactions to “Academic” Cognitive Enhancement:
Unsuspected Meaning of Ambivalence and Analogies, 21 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 606, 625 (2012).
5 Dan Larriviere et al., Responding to Requests from Adult Patients for Neuroenhancements: Guidance of the Ethics,
Law and Humanities Committee, 73 NEUROLOGY 1406, 1412 (2009).
6 Elisabeth Hildt, Klaus Lieb & Andreas G. Franke, Life Context of Pharmacological Academic Performance
Enhancement Among University Students—AQualitative Approach, 15 BMCMED. ETHICS 23 (2014).
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320  Regulation of cognitive enhancement devices
non-uniform effects can be traced back to the heterogeneity of cortical excitability and
brainwave activity in (potential) users. Somemedications can chance excitability of the
brain, making the brain more or less responsive to tDCS. But somemedication can en-
hance the effect of tDCS by a factor of 20, and it is unknown what some food supple-
ments do on tDCS. Thus, what is safe for one person is not safe for another person.
This is analogous to drinking alcohol when one takesmedication and comes to the core
question of the discussion. Should these CEDs be considered like alcohol, which can
have cognitive enhancing effects at a lowdose butworsening at higher doses andbe reg-
ulated rather like alcohol than as amedical device?Potentially, as is the case for driving a
car or in some countries for the possession and recreational use of a fireweapon, requir-
ing some kind of training and certificate to legally allow the personal use of moderate-
to high-risk CEDs?
As mentioned, the critical question remains whether these devices really pose such
a health risk that requiresmedical device regulation? And secondly, whether they really
amount to enhancing effects, andarenot just statistical findings rather thanbehaviorally
relevant cognitive improvements?Thepopular press, internet sites, and social networks
are widely advocating the use of TMS and tDCS as CEDs.7 In stark contrast, similar to
medications for enhancement purposes (eg Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors
and stimulants as cognitive enhancers), there is currently no substantive evidence that
so-called CEDs produce lasting enhancement effects outside of research or clinical set-
tings, ie real-world enhancement effects.8 In a certainwayboth are linked. If theseCEDs
do not exert a real improvement in cognitive abilities, ie if they are perceived as ineffec-
tive, nobody will continue using them, and thus the risk for society is very limited. Or,
if they are perceived as effective by the general public, but in reality do not amount to
any real enhancement effects, shouldn’t we focus on education and public awareness
rather thanmedically regulating devices that offer no real benefit? In fact, medically reg-
ulating these devices, especially at present, may create and strengthen the illusion that
these devices are indeed beneficial. On the other hand, if they really have an important
beneficial effect, shouldwemedically regulate their use, and thereby potentially lose the
prospect of great societal benefit?
Rather than urging for the regulation of CEDs asmedical devices, shouldn’t we urge
for the regulation of the use of CEDs, especially those CEDs that have corollaries in the
medical domain and are currently on themarket?This could potentially be donewithin
theMDDbyoverseeing the use ofCEDsbasedupon an ancillary list, or alternatively via
a combination of product safety regulation and specific legislation concerning the use
of CEDs (eg similar tominimum drinking level laws for alcohol use and driving license
laws). A possible intermediate solution would be to start with the fourth option listed
above, and if CEDs really prove to be efficacious as enhancers, to regulate these devices
asmedical devices. By being safe, we suggest first of all that the amount of current deliv-
eredby thedevice is stablewithout peak current deliveries, and thatwhat is set as output
is exactly the delivered current output. Safety limitations can be built into the devices,
so that they stop automatically after a certain amount of charge is delivered to the brain,
7 Brem, supra note 1, at 1059.
8 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Novel neurotechnologies: intervening in the brain. http://nuffieldbioethics.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Novel neurotechnologies report PDF web 0.pdf (last accessed Septem-
ber 10, 2014).
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preventing overdoses. Limitations on themaximal amplitude andmaximal duration for
that amplitude can be programed to remainwithin safety limits. Furthermore, amanual
should be supplied showing the safe application of the device, eg the locations where
electrodes can be applied safely, reminding the users to apply enough water to keep
the electrodes wet, etc. In view of potential risks, albeit very rare, it’s advisable to limit
the use of CEDs to competent adults, analogous to othermind-influencing techniques,
such as the consumption of alcohol or soft drugs in some countries or states. Although
open for debate and dependent on the type of device, adequate regulation likely re-
quires minimal professional oversight (eg a training session with a trained health care
professional) before personal use should be allowed. Whereas an adequate level of pro-
fessional oversight is typically guaranteed in therapeutic settings, this is clearly not the
case in non-therapeutic contexts regarding personal use of CEDs.
Moreover, regulation itself is not sufficient.We additionally need to focus on the ed-
ucation of the general public and health care providers concerning the real possibilities,
benefits, and risks of CEDs. For example, do medical researchers, doctors, and other
professionals have a professional and/or societal duty to correctly inform the public
and to prevent misguided beliefs concerning CEDs?
In sum, specific public health guidelines regarding the professional and personal use
of CEDs are needed and a number of important questions, of which several are men-
tioned in this commentary, need to be addressed if the regulation of CEDs as medical
devices is pursued. In themeantime,wepropose to regulateCEDs tobe safe and restrict
their use to adults including a minimum level of professional oversight.
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